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Abstract A recent line of work on lattice codes for Gaussian wiretap channels
introduced a new lattice invariant called secrecy gain as a code design criterion
which captures the confusion that lattice coding produces at an eavesdropper.
Following up the study of unimodular lattice wiretap codes [1], this paper
investigates 2- and 3-modular lattices and compares them with unimodular
lattices. Most even 2- and 3-modular lattices are found to have better perfor-
mance (that is, a higher secrecy gain) than the best unimodular lattices in
dimension n, 2 ≤ n ≤ 23. Odd 2-modular lattices are considered, too, and
three lattices are found to outperform the best unimodular lattices.
Keywords Wiretap codes · Gaussian channel · Lattice codes · Secrecy gain ·
Modular lattices · Theta series
1 Introduction
In his seminal work, Wyner introduced the wiretap channel [2], a discrete
memoryless channel where the sender Alice transmits confidential messages to
a legitimate receiver Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve, who has
only partial access to what Bob sees. Both reliable and confidential communi-
cation between Alice and Bob is shown to be achievable at the same time, by
exploiting the physical difference between the channel to Bob and that to Eve,
without the use of cryptographic means. Since then, many results of informa-
tion theoretical nature have been found for various classes of wiretap channels
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ranging from Gaussian point-to-point channels to relay networks (see e.g. [3]
for a survey) capturing the trade-off between reliability and secrecy and aiming
at determining the highest information rate that can be achieved with perfect
secrecy, the so-called secrecy capacity. Coding results focusing on constructing
concrete codes that can be implemented in a specific channel are much fewer
(see [4,5] for wiretap codes dealing with channels with erasures, [6] for Polar
wiretap codes and [7] for wiretap Rayleigh fading channels.
In this paper, we will focus on Gaussian wiretap channels, whose secrecy
capacity was established in [8]. Examples of existing Gaussian wiretap codes
were designed for binary inputs, as in [9,10]. A different approach was adopted
in [11], where lattice codes were proposed, using as design criterion a new
lattice invariant called secrecy gain, defined as the maximum of its secrecy
function (Section II), which was shown to characterize the confusion at the
eavesdropper. A recent study on a new design criterion called flatness factor
confirms that to confuse Eve, the secrecy gain should be maximized [12]. This
suggests the study of the secrecy gain of lattices as a way to understand how to
design a good Gaussian lattice wiretap code. Belfiore and Sole´ [13] discovered a
symmetry point, called weak secrecy gain, in the secrecy function of unimodular
lattices (generalized to all ℓ-modular lattices [14]) and conjectured that the
weak secrecy gain is actually the secrecy gain. Anne-Maria Ernvall-Hyto¨nen
[15,16] invented a method to prove or disprove the conjecture for unimodular
lattices. Up to date, secrecy gains of a special class of unimodular lattices called
extremal unimodular lattices and all unimodular lattices in dimensions up to
23 are computed [14,1]. The asymptotic behavior of the average weak secrecy
gain as a function of the dimension n was investigated and an achievable
lower bound on the secrecy gain of even unimodular lattices was given [14].
Numerical upper bounds on the secrecy gains of unimodular lattices in general
and unimodular lattices constructed from self-dual binary codes were given to
compared with the achievable lower bound [17].
This paper studies the weak secrecy gain of 2- and 3-modular lattices. Pre-
liminary work [18] showed that most of the known even 2- and 3-modular
lattices in dimensions up to 24 have secrecy gains bigger than the best uni-
modular lattices. After recalling how to compute the weak secrecy gain of even
2- and 3-modular lattices using the theory of modular forms, we extend our
study to a class of odd 2-modular lattices constructed from self-dual codes. We
propose two methods to compute their weak secrecy gains and find three of
these lattices have secrecy gains bigger than the best unimodular lattices. We
then conclude that, at least in dimensions up to 23, 2- and 3-modular lattices
are a better option than unimodular lattices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first
give a brief introduction to modular lattices and their theta series as well as
recall the definition of the secrecy gain and the previous results concerning
this lattice invariant. The main results are given in Section 3. Two approaches
to compute the theta series of modular lattices are given, one making use of
the modular form theory while the other utilizing the connection between the
theta series and the weight enumerator of self-dual codes. Weak secrecy gains
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of several 2- and 3-modular lattices computed are then compared with the
best unimodular lattices in Section 4. In Section 5, we summarize our results
and give some future works.
2 Preliminaries and previous results
Consider a Gaussian wiretap channel, which is modeled as follows: Alice wants
to send data to Bob over a Gaussian channel whose noise variance is given by
σ2b . Eve is the eavesdropper trying to intercept data through another Gaussian
channel with noise variance σ2e , where σ
2
b < σ
2
e , in order to have a positive
secrecy capacity [8]. More precisely, the model is
y = x+ vb
z = x+ ve.
(1)
x ∈ Rn is the transmitted signal. y and z are the received signals at Bob’s,
respectively Eve’s side. vb and ve denote the Gaussian noise vectors at Bob’s,
respectively Eve’s side, each component of both vectors are with zero mean,
and respective variance σ2b and σ
2
e . In this paper, we choose x to be a codeword
coming from a specially designed lattice of dimension n, namely, we consider
lattice coding. Let us thus start by recalling some concepts concerning lattices,
in particular, modular lattices.
A lattice Λ is an additive subgroup of Rn, which can be described in terms
of its generator matrix M by
Λ = {x = uM |u ∈ Zm},
where
M =


v11 v12 · · · v1n
v21 v22 · · · v2n
· · · · · ·
vm1 vm2 · · · vmn


and the row vectors vi = (vi1, · · · , vin), i = 1, 2, · · · , m form a basis of the
lattice Λ. The matrix
G =MMT ,
whereMT denotes the transpose ofM , is called theGram matrix of the lattice.
It is easy to see that the (i, j)th entry of G is the inner product of the ith and
jth row vectors of M , denoted by
G(i,j) = vi · vj .
The determinant det(Λ) of a lattice Λ is the determinant of the matrix G,
which is independent of the choice of the matrix M . A fundamental region
for a lattice is a building block which when repeated many times fills the
whole space with just one lattice point in each copy. There are many different
ways of choosing a fundamental region for a lattice Λ, but the volume of the
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fundamental region is uniquely determined and called the volume vol(Λ) of Λ,
which is exactly
√
det(Λ). Let us see an example of a fundamental region of
a lattice. A Voronoi cell VΛ(x) of a lattice point x in Λ consists of the points
in the space that are closer to x than to any other lattice points of Λ.
The dual of a lattice Λ of dimension n is defined to be
Λ∗ = {x ∈ Rn : x · λ ∈ Z, for all λ ∈ Λ}.
A lattice Λ is called an integral lattice if Λ ⊂ Λ∗. The norm of any lattice
point in an integral lattice Λ is always an integer. If the norm is even for any
lattice point, then Λ is called an even lattice. Otherwise, it is called an odd
lattice. A lattice is said to be equivalent, or geometrically similar to its dual,
if it differs from its dual only by possibly a rotation, reflection and change
of scale. An integral lattice that is equivalent to its dual is called a modular
lattice. Alternatively as it was first defined by H.-G. Quebbemann [19], an
n-dimensional integral lattice Λ is modular if there exists a similarity σ of Rn
such that σ(Λ∗) = Λ. If σ multiplies norms by ℓ, Λ is said to be ℓ-modular.
The determinant of an ℓ-modular lattice Λ of dimension n is given by
det(Λ) = ℓ
n
2 . (2)
This is because, on the one hand, det(Λ∗) = det(Λ)−1 by definition and, on
the other hand, ℓndet(Λ∗) = det(Λ) since σ(Λ∗) = Λ. When ℓ = 1, det(Λ) = 1
and we recover the definition of unimodular lattice as an integral lattice whose
determinant is 1.
Example 1
Cℓ =
∑
d|ℓ
√
dZ, ℓ = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 23 (3)
is an ℓ-modular lattice [20]. When ℓ is a prime number, Cℓ = Z ⊕
√
ℓZ is a
two-dimensional ℓ-modular lattice with the similarity map σ taking (x, y) to
(
√
ℓy,
√
ℓx).
We will use some terminology from classical error correction codes in this
paper. Unfamiliar readers can refer to [21]. We will also assume basic knowl-
edge of algebraic number theory [22]. There is a classical way of constructing
ℓ-modular lattices from self-dual codes called Construction A. Let K = Q(
√
µ)
be a quadratic imaginary extension of the rational field Q constructed by ad-
joining to it the square root of a square free negative integer µ. The ring of
integers OK of K is given by
OK = Z[θ], θ =
{
1+
√
µ
2 , µ ≡ 1 (mod 4)√
µ, otherwise.
(4)
Let p be a prime number. Then the quotient ring R = OK/pOK is given by
R =


Fp × Fp, p is split in K;
Fp + uFp with u
2 = 0, p is ramified in K;
Fp2 , p is inert in K.
(5)
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Let k be a positive integer. Let
ρ : OkK → Rk
be the map of component wise reduction modulo pOK . Then the pre-image
ρ−1(C) of a self-dual code C over R of length k with carefully chosen µ and p
and possibly a re-scaling can give rise to a real ℓ-modular lattice of dimension
2k [23,24]. Examples will be specified in the sequel.
Definition 1 The theta series of a lattice Λ is defined by
ΘΛ(τ) = Σλ∈Λq||λ||
2
, q = eπiτ , τ ∈ H,
where ||λ||2 = λ·λ is called the (squared) norm of λ andH = {a+ib ∈ C|b > 0}
denotes the upper half plane.
The theta series of an integral lattice has a neat representation. Since the
norms are all integers, we can combine the terms with the same norm and
write
ΘΛ(τ) = Σ
∞
m=0Amq
m, (6)
where Am counts the number of lattice points with norm m. They are actually
modular forms [25].
We will also need the following functions and formulae from analytic num-
ber theory for our discussion, for which interested readers can refer to [26].
Definition 2 The Jacobi theta functions are defined as follows:

ϑ2(τ) = Σm∈Zq(m+
1
2 )
2
,
ϑ3(τ) = Σm∈Zqm
2
,
ϑ4(τ) = Σm∈Z(−q)m2 .
Definition 3 The Dedekind eta function is defined by
η(τ) = q
1
12
∞∏
m=1
(1− q2m).
The Jacobi theta functions and the Dedekind eta function are connected
as follows [26]: 

ϑ2(τ) =
2η(2τ)2
η(τ) ,
ϑ3(τ) =
η(τ)5
η( τ2 )
2η(2τ)2 ,
ϑ4(τ) =
η( τ2 )
2
η(τ) .
(7)
Lattice encoding for the wiretap channel (1) is done via a generic coset
coding strategy [11]: let Λe ⊂ Λb be two nested lattices. A k-bit message is
mapped to a coset in Λb/Λe, after which a vector is randomly chosen from the
coset as the encoded word. The lattice Λe can be interpreted as introducing
confusion for Eve, while Λb is intended to ensure reliability for Bob. Since a
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message is now corresponding to a coset of codewords instead of one single
codeword, the probability of correct decoding is then summing over the whole
coset (suppose that we do not have power constraint and are utilizing the
whole lattice to do the encoding). Here we are interested in computing Pc,e,
Eve’s probability of correct decision, and want to minimize this probability. It
was shown in [11,14] that to minimize Pc,e is to minimize∑
t∈Λe
e−||t||
2/2σ2e , (8)
which is easily recognized as the theta series of Λe at τ =
i
2πσ2e
. We hence only
care about values of τ such that τ = yi, y > 0.
Motivated by the above argument, the confusion brought by the lattice Λe
with respect to no coding (namely, use a scaled version of the lattice Zn with
the same volume) is measured as follows:
Definition 4 [11] Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice of volume vn. The secrecy
function of Λ is given by
ΞΛ(τ) =
ΘvZn(τ)
ΘΛ(τ)
, τ = yi, y > 0.
The secrecy gain is then the maximal value of the secrecy function with respect
to τ and is denoted by χΛ.
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Fig. 1 Secrecy function of BW16
ℓ-modular lattices were shown to have a symmetry point, called weak se-
crecy gain χwΛ, at τ =
i√
ℓ
in their secrecy function [14]. See Fig. 1 for an
example, where y is plotted in dB to transform the multiplicative symmetry
point into an additive symmetry point. BW16 is a 2-modular lattice. One can
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see there is a symmetry point at y = − 32 dB, which is
√
2
2 . This paper is
devoted to computing the weak secrecy gain of 2- and 3-modular lattices in
small dimensions.
3 The weak secrecy gain of 2- and 3-modular lattices in small
dimensions
The key to the computation of secrecy gains is the theta series of the cor-
responding lattice. We present here two approaches to obtain a closed form
expression of the theta series of 2- and 3-modular lattices: the modular form
approach and the weight enumerator approach. The modular form approach
relies on the fact that the theta series of an ℓ-modular lattice belongs to the
space of modular forms generated by some basic functions, which gives a de-
composition formula. The formula for even 2- and 3-modular lattices is com-
paratively simple while the formula for ℓ-modular lattices in general, including
the odd lattices, is rather complicated. A weight enumerator approach is added
in the computation for odd 2-modular lattices in the second subsection. This
approach exploits the connection between the weight enumerator of a self-
dual code and the theta series of a lattice constructed from this code. But
calculating the weight enumerator of the code adds considerable workload.
3.1 Even 2 and 3-modular lattices
The theta series of modular lattices are modular forms, which, roughly speak-
ing, are functions that stay “invariant” under the transformation by certain
subgroups of the group SL2(Z) [25]. The modular form theory shows that theta
series as modular forms are expressed in a polynomial in two basic modular
forms. We only need a few terms of a theta series to compute the coefficients
of this expression and obtain a closed form expression of the theta series. The
following lemma plays a crucial role in our calculation of the theta series of 2-
and 3-modular lattices.
Lemma 1 [19] The theta series of an even ℓ-modular lattice of dimension
n = 2k when ℓ = 1, 2, 3 belongs to a space of modular forms of weight k
generated by the functions Θλ2k0(τ)∆
µ
2k1
(τ) with integers λ, µ ≥ 0 satisfying
k0λ + k1µ = k, where for ℓ = 1, 2, 3, k0 = 4, 2, 1 respectively, k1 =
24
1+ℓ , Θ2k0(τ) denote the theta series of the modular lattices E8, D4 and A2,
respectively, and ∆2k1(τ) = (η(τ)η(ℓτ))
k1 .
Example 2 If ℓ = 1, we read from Lemma 1 that k0 = 4, k1 =
24
2 = 12,
Θ2k0(τ) = ΘE8(τ) and ∆2k1(τ) = η
24(τ). We then deduce that if Λ is an even
unimodular lattice of dimension n = 2k then
ΘΛ(τ) =
∑
4λ+12µ=k
aµΘ
λ
E8(τ)∆
µ
24(τ). (9)
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The formula (9) was adopted in [13,14] to compute the secrecy gains of
several even unimodular lattices.
In order to write the secrecy function, we need to have the theta series of
Zn scaled to the right volume. Now it follows from (2) that
Θ
ℓ
1
4 Zn
(τ) = ϑn3 (
√
ℓτ). (10)
According to Lemma 1, the theta series of an even 2-modular lattice Λ of
dimension n = 2k can be written as
ΘΛ(τ) =
∑
2λ+8µ=k
aµΘ
λ
D4(τ)∆
µ
16(τ), (11)
where
ΘD4(τ) =
1
2
(
ϑ43(τ) + ϑ
4
4(τ)
)
= 1 + 24q2 + 24q4 + 96q6 + · · · (12)
and
∆16(τ) = (η(τ)η(2τ))
8
.
By (7), we can write ∆16(τ) in terms of Jacobi theta functions and compute
the first few terms:
∆16(τ) =
1
256ϑ
8
2(τ)ϑ
4
3(τ)ϑ
4
4(τ)
= q2 − 8q4 + 12q6 + · · · . (13)
The secrecy function of an even 2-modular lattice Λ of dimension n is then
written as
ΞΛ(τ) =
ϑn3 (
√
2τ)∑
2λ+8µ=k aµΘ
λ
D4
(τ)∆µ16(τ)
,
or more conveniently,
1/ΞΛ(τ) =
∑
2λ+8µ=k aµ
ΘλD4 (τ)∆
µ
16(τ)
ϑn3 (
√
2τ)
=
∑
2λ+8µ=k aµ
(
ΘD4 (τ)
ϑ43(
√
2τ)
)λ (
∆16(τ)
ϑ163 (
√
2τ)
)µ
.
Now we only need to know the coefficients aµ in order to compute the weak
secrecy gain of a 2-modular lattice.
Let us compute an example to show how the coefficients aµ’s in (11) are
computed. By substituting (12) and (13) into (11), we have a formal sum with
coefficients represented by the aµ’s. Then by comparing this formal sum with
(6), we obtain a number of linear equations in the aµ’s. When we have enough
equations, the aµ’s can be recovered by solving a linear system.
Example 3 BW16 is an even lattice with minimum norm 4. The theta series
of BW16 looks like
ΘBW16 (τ) = 1 + 0q
2 +A4q
4 + · · · , A4 6= 0.
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On the other hand, by (11), (12) and (13),
ΘBW16 (τ) = a0Θ
4
D4
(τ) + a1∆16(τ)
= a0(1 + 24q
2 + · · · )4 + a1(q2 + · · · )
= a0(1 + 96q
2 + · · · ) + a1(q2 + · · · )
= a0 + (96a0 + a1)q
2 + · · · .
We now have two linear equations in two unknowns a0 and a1
{
a0 = 1
96a0 + a1 = 0
which gives a0 = 1 and a1 = −96, yielding the theta series
ΘBW16 = Θ
4
D4 − 96∆16. (14)
The weak secrecy gain of BW16 can then be approximated using Mathematica
[27] (see Fig. 1):
χBW16 = 2.20564. (15)
Similarly according to Lemma 1, the theta series of an even 3-modular
lattice Λ of dimension n = 2k can be written as
ΘΛ(τ) =
∑
λ+6µ=k
aµΘ
λ
A2(τ)∆
µ
12(τ), (16)
where
ΘA2(τ) = ϑ2(2τ)ϑ2(6τ) + ϑ3(2τ)ϑ3(6τ)
= 1 + 6q2 + 0q4 + 6q6 + · · · (17)
and
∆12(τ) = (η(τ)η(3τ))
6
.
We can also compute the first few terms of ∆12(τ):
∆12(τ) = q
2 − 6q4 + 9q6 + · · · . (18)
The secrecy function of an even 3-modular lattice Λ of dimension n is
1/ΞΛ(τ) =
∑
λ+6µ=k
aµΘ
λ
A2
(τ)∆µ12(τ)
ϑn3 (
√
3τ)
.
=
∑
λ+6µ=k aµ
(
ΘA2 (τ)
ϑ23(
√
3τ)
)λ (
∆12(τ)
ϑ123 (
√
3τ)
)µ
.
Table 1 summarizes the weak secrecy gains of even 2- and 3-modular lat-
tices computed. The basic information about these lattices, such as minimum
norm and kissing number can be found in [28].
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Table 1 Weak secrecy gains of the known even 2- and 3-modular lattices
dim lattice ℓ theta series χw
Λ
2 A2 3 ΘA2 1.01789
4 D4 2 ΘD4 1.08356
12 K12 3 Θ6A2 − 36∆12 1.66839
14 C2 ×G(2, 3) 3 Θ7
A2
− 42ΘA2∆12 1.85262
16 BW16 2 Θ4D4 − 96∆16 2.20564
20 HS20 2 Θ5D4 − 120ΘD4∆16 3.03551
22 A2 × A11 3 Θ11A2 − 66Θ
5
A2
∆12 3.12527
24 L24.2 3 Θ12A2 − 72Θ
6
A2
∆12 3.92969
−216∆212
3.2 Odd 2-modular lattices
Odd 2-modular lattices were constructed in [23,24] via Construction A. They
are, by the time of writing this paper, the only known instances of odd 2-
modular lattices. There is a natural connection between the theta series of
the lattice constructed from a code C via Construction A and an appropriate
weight enumerator of the code C. We will exploit this connection to obtain a
closed form expression for these lattices.
For the rest of the paper, we will let K = Q(
√−2) and R = OK/3OK ,
where the notations are explained in Section 2. According to (4), since −2 ≡
2 mod 4, the ring of integersOK ofK isOK = Z[
√−2] = {a+b√−2|a, b ∈ Z}.
Now we consider the decomposition of the prime ideal 3OK . Since 3 = (1 +√−2)(1 − √−2) and (1 + √−2)OK 6= (1 −
√−2)OK , the ideal 3OK splits.
According to (5), the quotient ring R = OK/3OK = F3 × F3. Note that the
ring F3 + vF3 with v
2 = 1 is isomorphic to the ring F3 × F3, through an
isomorphism δ : a(v − 1) + b(v + 1) 7→ (a, b). We will identify R = OK/3OK
with the ring F3+vF3 and use the two notations interchangeably. In particular,
we will identify the coset a + 3OK with a ∈ F3, and the coset
√−2 + 3OK
with v.
Let C be a code of length n = 2k over R = F3 + vF3 = OK/3OK, which
is by definition a R-submodule of Rn. According to Construction A, ρ−1(C)
is a lattice over OK
1, say, with generator matrix

λ11 · · · λ1k· · ·
λk1 · · · λkk

 .
1 A k-dimensional lattice can be defined in a more general setting by a free abelian group
of rank k.
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Let 1√
3
ρ−1(C)real denote the real lattice defined by the generator matrix
1√
3


Re(λ11) Im(λ11) · · · Re(λ1k) Im(λ1k)
Im(λ11) Re(λ11) · · · Im(λ1k) Re(λ1k)
· · ·
Re(λk1) Im(λk1) · · · Re(λkk) Im(λkk)
Im(λk1) Re(λk1) · · · Im(λkk) Re(λkk)

 .
Now we look at the theta series of the lattice 1√
3
ρ−1(C)real constructed
from a code C over R.
Definition 5 [24] The length function lK of an element r in R = F3 + vF3 =
OK/3OK is defined by
lK(r) = inf{xx¯|x ∈ r ⊂ OK}, (19)
where x¯ is the complex conjugation of x.
One computes the length of the nine elements of R as follows:


lK(0) = 0
lK(±1) = 1
lK(±v) = 2
lK(±1± v) = 3.
(20)
Definition 6 [24] The length composition nl(x), l = 0, 1, 2, 3 of a vector x in
Rn counts the number of coordinates of length l. The length weight enumerator
of a code C over R is then defined by
lweC(a, b, c, d) =
∑
c∈C
an0(c)bn1(c)cn2(c)dn3(c). (21)
Define four theta series θl, l = 0, 1, 2, 3 corresponding to the four different
lengths of elements of R:


θ0 =
∑
x∈3OK q
xx¯
3
θ1 =
∑
x∈1+3OK q
xx¯
3
θ2 =
∑
x∈√−2+3OK q
xx¯
3
θ3 =
∑
x∈1+√−2+3OK q
xx¯
3 .
(22)
Recalling that OK = {a + b
√−2|a, b ∈ Z}, the theta series are written as
double sums. 

θ0 =
∑
a∈Z
∑
b∈Z q
3a2+6b2
θ1 =
∑
a∈Z
∑
b∈Z q
3(a+ 13 )
2+6b2
θ2 =
∑
a∈Z
∑
b∈Z q
3a2+6(b+ 13 )
2
θ3 =
∑
a∈Z
∑
b∈Z q
3(a+ 13 )
2+6(b+ 13 )
2
.
(23)
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We already know how to handle the lm2 type of infinite sum, namely,∑
m∈Z
qlm
2
=
∑
m∈Z
(ql)m
2
= ϑ3(lτ).
For the (3m+ 1)2 type of infinite sum, we first observe that, on one hand,∑
m∈Z
qm
2
=
∑
m∈Z
q(3m)
2
+
∑
m∈Z
q(3m+1)
2
+
∑
m∈Z
q(3m−1)
2
and, on the other hand,∑
m∈Z
q(3m+1)
2
=
∑
m∈Z
q(3m−1)
2
.
We then conclude that
∑
m∈Z q
(3m+1)2 = 12
(∑
m∈Z q
m2 −∑m∈Z q(3m)2
)
= 12 (ϑ3(τ) − ϑ3(9τ)) .
The four theta series defined above are then computed as

θ0 = ϑ3(3τ)ϑ3(6τ)
θ1 =
1
2
(
ϑ3(
τ
3 )− ϑ3(3τ)
)
ϑ3(6τ)
θ2 =
1
2ϑ3(3τ)
(
ϑ3(
2τ
3 )− ϑ3(6τ)
)
θ3 =
1
4
(
ϑ3(
τ
3 )− ϑ3(3τ)
) (
ϑ3(
2τ
3 )− ϑ3(6τ)
)
.
(24)
Theorem 1
Θ 1√
3
ρ−1(C)(q) = lweC(θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3). (25)
Proof The theta series of the lattice 1√
3
ρ−1(C) is by definition
Θ 1√
3
ρ−1(C)(τ) =
∑
λ∈ 1√
3
ρ−1(C) q
||λ||2
=
∑
c∈C
∑
x∈ 1√
3
(c+3OkK)
qxx¯
=
∑
c∈C θ
n0(c)
0 θ
n1(c)
1 θ
n2(c)
2 θ
n3(c)
3
= lweC(θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3).
As it was remarked in [23] (Remark 3.8) and later proved in [24], if C
is a self-dual code over R with respect to Hermitian inner product, then
1√
3
ρ−1(C)real is an odd 2-modular lattice.
Example 4 A Hermitian self-dual code C over R of length 4 was constructed
in [24]. It is a linear code with a generator matrix
GH =
[
1 0 v −1− v
0 1 −1 + v v
]
. (26)
One can generate all the 81 codewords and compute the length weight enu-
merator:
lweC(a, b, c, d) = a
4 + 4a2d2 + 16abcd+ 8ad3 + 8b3d
+4b2c2 + 24bcd2 + 8c3d+ 8d4.
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The theta series of the 8-dimensional odd 2-modular lattice is then computed
by (25) (using a computer software, for example, Mathematica [27] to output
the first few terms).
Θ 1√
3
ρ−1(C)(τ)
= ϑ3(3τ)
4ϑ3(6τ)
4
+ 14ϑ3(3τ)
3
(
ϑ3(
τ
3 )− ϑ3(3τ)
) (
ϑ3(
2τ
3 )− ϑ3(6τ)
)4
+ 32ϑ3(3τ)
2ϑ3(6τ)
2
(
ϑ3(
τ
3 )− ϑ3(3τ)
)2 (
ϑ3(
2τ
3 )− ϑ3(6τ)
)2
+ 58ϑ3(3τ)ϑ3(6τ)
(
ϑ3(
τ
3 )− ϑ3(3τ)
)3 (
ϑ3(
2τ
3 )− ϑ3(6τ)
)3
+ 14ϑ3(6τ)
3
(
ϑ3(
τ
3 )− ϑ3(3τ)
)4 (
ϑ3(
2τ
3 )− ϑ3(6τ)
)
+ 132
(
ϑ3(
τ
3 )− ϑ3(3τ)
)4 (
ϑ3(
2τ
3 )− ϑ3(6τ)
)4
= 1 + 32q2 + 128q3 + 240q4 + · · · .
This method has the advantage of being self-contained in its deduction.
But the computation of the weight enumerator of the code C is tedious and,
worse still, as the dimension increases, it may become infeasible. Let us fall
back to the first approach adopted in the previous subsection.
First we need a formula similar to Lemma 1 which deals with the theta
series of odd 2-modular lattices. There is indeed a formula which deals with the
theta series of ℓ-modular lattice, including the odd lattices, for ℓ = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 23
discovered by E. M. Rains and N. J. A. Sloane.
Lemma 2 [20] Define
f1(τ) = ΘCℓ(τ),
where the lattice Cℓ is as defined in (3). Let ηℓ(τ) = Πd|ℓη(dτ) and let
Dℓ = 24, 16, 12, 8, 8, 6, 4, 4, 4, 2 corresponding to ℓ = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 23.
Define
f2(τ) =


(
ηℓ( τ2 )η
ℓ(2τ)
ηℓ(τ)2
) Dℓ
dim Cℓ , ℓ is odd;(
η(
ℓ
2
)( τ2 )η
( ℓ
2
)(4τ)
η(
ℓ
2
)(τ)η(
ℓ
2
)(2τ)
) Dℓ
dim Cℓ
, ℓ is even.
The theta series of an ℓ-modular lattice Λ of dimension kdim(C(ℓ)) can be
written as
ΘΛ(τ) = f1(τ)
k
⌊k ord1(f1)⌋∑
i=0
aif2(τ)
i, (27)
where ord1(f1) is the divisor of the modular form f1(τ), which, in this case, is
1
8
∑
d|ℓ d if ℓ is odd and
1
6
∑
d|ℓ d if ℓ is even.
Let us now take ℓ = 2. Then C2 = Z⊕√2Z hence
f1(τ) = ΘC2(τ)
= ϑ3(τ)ϑ3(2τ)
= 1 + 2q + 2q2 + 4q3 + · · · .
(28)
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Next, ord1(f1) is computed to be
1
2 . D2 = 16. Finally since 2 is even
f2(τ) =
(
η( τ2 )η(4τ)
η(τ)η(2τ)
) 16
2
=
ϑ22(2τ)ϑ
2
4(τ)
4ϑ23(τ)ϑ
2
3(2τ)
.
We observe that the denominator of f2(τ) is 4f
2
1 (τ). We then define a function
∆4(τ) , f
2
1 (τ)f2(τ)
= 14ϑ
2
2(2τ)ϑ
2
4(τ)
= q − 4q2 + 4q3 + · · · ,
(29)
and rewrite (27) in the form of (11):
ΘΛ(τ) =
⌊ k2 ⌋∑
i=0
aif
k−2i
1 (τ)∆
i
4(τ). (30)
For lattices in small dimensions, the first few terms of the theta series can
be computed numerically using computer softwares, for example, Magma [29].
Example 5 A generator matrix of the 8-dimensional odd 2-modular lattice in
Example 4 can be computed from the generator matrix (26) of the code C:
M =
1√
3


1 0 0 0 0
√
2 −1 −√2
0
√
2 0 0 1 0 −1 −√2
0 0 1 0 −1 √2 0 √2
0 0 0
√
2 1 −√2 1 0
0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 3
√
2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
√
2


.
To make the typing easy, we compute the Gram matrix
MMT =


2 1 0 −1 0 2 −1 −2
1 2 −1 0 1 0 −1 −2
0 −1 2 −1 −1 2 0 2
−1 0 −1 2 1 −2 1 0
0 1 −1 1 3 0 0 0
2 0 2 −2 0 6 0 0
−1 −1 0 1 0 0 3 0
−2 −2 2 0 0 0 0 6


and input it to Magma to generate the lattice Λ. The first few terms of
Θ 1√
3
ρ−1(C)(τ) can be obtained (by the command ThetaSeries(Λ,0,4);):
Θ 1√
3
ρ−1(C)(q) = 1 + 32q
2 + 128q3 + 240q4 + · · · .
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Table 2 Weak secrecy gains of odd 2-modular lattices constructed from self-dual codes
dim theta series χw
Λ
8 f4
1
− 8f2
1
∆4 1.22672
12 f6
1
− 12f4
1
∆4 1.49049
16 f8
1
− 16f6
1
∆4 2.06968
18 f9
1
− 18f7
1
∆4 + 18f51∆
2
4
2.35656
20 f10
1
− 20f8
1
∆4 + 40f61∆
2
4
2.70165
22 f111 − 22f
9
1∆4 + 66f
7
1∆
2
4 − 4f
5
1∆
3
4 3.11161
24 f121 − 24f
10
1 ∆4 + 96f
8
1∆
2
4 − 28f
6
1∆
3
4 3.60867
26 f131 − 26f
11
1 ∆4 + 130f
9
1∆
2
4 +−80f
7
1∆
3
4 4.21349
28 f14
1
− 28f12
1
∆4 + 168f101 ∆
2
4
4.98013
−176f8
1
∆3
4
+ 32f6
1
∆4
4
30 f15
1
− 30f13
1
∆4 + 210f111 ∆
2
4
5.72703
−282f91∆
3
4 + 112f
7
1∆
4
4
Now in dimension 8, the theta series of a 2-modular lattice can be written as
a0f1(τ)
4 + a1f1(τ)
2∆4(τ) + a2∆4(τ)
2
= a0(1 + 8q + 32q
2 + · · · ) + a1(q + 0q2 + · · · )
+a2(q
2 + · · · )
= a0 + (8a0 + a1)q + (32a0 + 0 + a2)q
2 + · · · .
(31)
We then have three linear equations in three unknowns a0, a1 and a2

a0 = 1
8a0 + a1 = 0
32a0 + a2 = 32,
which gives a0 = 1, a1 = −8 and a2 = 0, yielding the theta series
Θ 1√
3
ρ−1(C)(q) = f1(τ)
4 − 8f1(τ)2∆4(τ). (32)
Theta series of the twelve odd 2-modular lattices constructed in [24] are
computed and shown in Table 2, as polynomials in f1 and ∆4 for simplicity.
Their weak secrecy gains are approximated using Mathematica [27].
4 Best known lattices
Now that we have computed the weak secrecy gains of several 2- and 3-modular
lattices, we want to compare them with the best unimodular lattices in their
respective dimensions. Figure 2 compares the secrecy gains of the best uni-
modular lattices with the weak secrecy gains of the 2- and 3-modular lattices
we have computed. We can see that most of these even 2- and 3-modular lat-
tices, indicated by disconnected big dots, outperform the unimodular lattices
except in dimension 22, and three of the odd 2-modular lattices, indicated by
disconnected small dots, outperform the unimodular lattices, in particular, in
16 Fuchun Lin et al.
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Fig. 2 The weak secrecy gain of 2- and 3-modular lattices vs. unimodular lattices as a
function of the dimension n
Table 3 List of 2- and 3-modular lattices out-performing the best unimodular lattices
dim lattice ℓ χΛ
2 Z2 1 1
2 A2 3 ≥ 1.01789
4 Z4 1 1
4 D4 2 ≥ 1.08356
12 D+
12
1 1.6
12 K12 3 ≥ 1.66839
14 (E27)
+ 1 1.77778
14 C2 ×G(2, 3) 3 ≥ 1.85262
16 (D2
8
)+ 1 2
16 1√
3
ρ−1(C)real 2 ≥ 2.06968
16 BW16 2 ≥ 2.20564
18 (D3
6
)+ or (A2
9
)+ 1 2.28571
18 1√
3
ρ−1(C)real 2 ≥ 2.35656
20 (A4
5
)+ 1 2.66667
20 1√
3
ρ−1(C)real 2 ≥ 2.70165
20 HS20 2 ≥ 3.03551
22 (A22
1
)+ 1 3.2
22 A2 ×A11 3 ≥ 3.12527
dimension 18, the odd 2-modular lattice has the best secrecy gain known by
now.
Table 3 gives a list of 2- and 3-modular lattices out-performing the best
unimodular lattices.
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5 Conclusion and future work
This paper computes the weak secrecy gains of several known 2- and 3-modular
lattices in small dimensions. Most of the even 2- and 3-modular lattices and
three of the odd 2-modular lattices have a higher secrecy gain than the best
unimodular lattices. We then conclude that, at least in dimensions up to 23,
2- and 3-modular lattices are better option for Gaussian wiretap channel.
A line of future work would naturally be investigating ℓ-modular lattices
for other values of ℓ to understand if bigger ℓ allows better modular lattices in
terms of secrecy gain. Also, more 2- and 3-modular lattice examples should be
found to get a better understanding of why they have a higher secrecy gain,
since a classification of such lattices is currently unavailable even in small
dimensions.
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